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I teach courses in informal logical and in ethics. Several years ago it struck me that if one 
accepts the traditional classification of certain arguments as fallacies, then one must dismiss the 
major types of ethical argument as essentially fallacious as well. The alleged fallacies I have in 
mind are the appeal to pity (argumentum ad misericordiam), appeal to fear (argumentum ad 
baculum), appeal to authority (argumentum ad verecundiam), and appeal to popularity 
(argumentum ad populum). Each of these arguments plays an important role in practical 
reasoning and the justification of ethical claims. If we were to dismiss them, in the manner of 
some textbooks, we would be at a serious loss. 
Consider the following three exchanges between M, a mother and ordinary moralist, and 
S, her skeptical son who is well-versed in the traditional fallacies. 
 
M: You should obey the speed limit. Otherwise, you=ll be stopped by the police and fined. 
S: That=s an obvious appeal to fear. 
M: If you speed, you=re more likely to be killed or injured in an accident. 
S: Another attempt to scare me. 
M: It=s against the law to speed. You should obey the law.   
S: Now you=re appealing to authority. 
M: You should obey the laws because they are enacted by a democratic government. 
S: That=s an appeal to popularity. The majority isn=t always right. 
M: When you speed you risk the lives of others. 
S: So? Are you trying to appeal to pity? 
 
M: President Bush shouldn=t go to war in Iraq. It will bring misery and death to innocent 
civilians. 
S: You are appealing to pity. One can=t wage war without getting one=s hands dirty. 
M: It will provoke a backlash against American interests in the Middle East. 
S: An appeal to force. Why should we cave in to the threats of Islamic radicals. 
M: World opinion is overwhelmingly against the war. 
S: An appeal to popularity. Who cares what a bunch of foreigners think? 
M: The U.S. has not obtained the approval of the United Nations. 
S: An appeal to authority. Why let them decide whether the war is justified? 
M: Come on? George Bush really just wants to control Iraqi oil. 
S: You can=t show why the war is wrong, so now you=re resorting to ad hominem attack. 
 
M: Don=t pick up the poor kitty by the tail. It hurts her. 
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S: You=re appealing to pity. Why should I care if it hurts the cat? 
M: How would you like it if I picked you up by the ears? 
S: Is that an appeal to force? Are you threatening me? 
M: No one likes a person who is needlessly cruel. 
S: Now you=re appealing to popularity. 
M: I=m your mother, and I=m telling you not to hurt the cat! 
S: So at last you=re taking refuge in parental authority. 
M: It=s simply wrong to be cruel to animals. 
S: Why? You are begging the question. Give me one valid reason why it=s wrong. 
 
Each of the above dialogues consists of five arguments which are met by charges of 
fallacy. While some arguments may miss the mark, the cumulative impression is that there is 
something morally obtuse about the skeptic. For in dismissing the appeal to pity, he rules out 
sympathy for human suffering. In dismissing appeals to fear, he rules out prudential concern with 
how others will respond to his actions. And in dismissing authority and popularity, he denies that 
law, democracy, or the consensus of humanity should have a bearing on his moral decisions. One 
wonders if there are any moral arguments he could accept that wouldn’t rely on one of the 
alleged fallacies. 
No informal logician, to my knowledge, has used fallacy theory to dismiss morality. It is 
unlikely that such radical conclusions are intended. Yet many authors of traditional textbooks on 
logic and the fallacies do not seem to have inquired deeply into the nature of moral argument, the 
distinction between it and other types of argument, and the issue of precisely when appeals to 
pity and fear are problematic. Moreover, in recent years, traditional accounts of these fallacies 
have come under attack. Douglas Walton has written a series of books on The Place of Emotion 
in Argument (1992), and the Appeal to Pity (1997a), Appeal to Expert Opinion (1997b), and 
Appeal to Popular Opinion (1999) which offer a richer and more nuanced view of such 
arguments. Others have made a case for similar ideas in the pages of Informal Logic (Coleman, 
1995;  Levi, 1999; Hansen, 2000). One theme that emerges from this literature is that appeals to 
pity, fear, authority, and popularity are not fallacies in the same sense as affirming the 
consequent or equivocation. They are not errors in logic or confusions designed to trick people. 
They are more like arguments from analogy B a distinctive and perfectly legitimate form of 
reasoning which can be strong or weak, depending on the particular case in question. 
 
 
Pity and Fear 
 
Appeals to pity and  appeals to fear are related types of argument. Both rely on emotion, 
and both are primarily relevant to the domain of practical reasoning. One invokes  sympathy for 
others and entreats us to help them; the other invokes prudential concern for our own well-being 
and warns us to avoid future harm. Both are regarded with suspicion. In playing upon emotion, 
they are seen as corrupting reason. As one text puts it, Athe fallacy of appeal to pity tries to short-
circuit our thinking by exploiting our feelings” (Engel, 1994: p.219). The rational person is 
imagined as a Stoic or Mr. Spock whose deliberations are not touched by emotion. The classic 
exemplar here is Socrates, who in the Apology, refused to beg the jury with tears or bring his 
family into court to arouse pity. Such tactics, he says, Abring shame upon the city@ and those who 
employ them Aare in no way better than women@ (Plato, 1981: 35b). 
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Such dualism of reason and emotion is dubious psychology. Also, it involves a normative 
judgment on pity that many moral philosophers would dispute. For example, David Hume based 
ethics on sympathy and other passions. He argued that it is sentiment, not reason, that is the 
source of moral motivation and moral distinctions. Reason is merely instrumental, for it alone 
can never motivate action or oppose passion. Strictly speaking, it is Anot contrary to reason to 
prefer the destruction of the whole world to he scratching of my finger@ (Hume, 1978: p.416). It 
is the sentiment of humanity that makes us averse to hurting others, or encourages us to practice 
the virtue of benevolence. Other philosophers have made a similar case. Schopenhauer based 
ethics on Mitleid, variously translated as pity or compassion. Christian thinkers such as Paul 
Tillich and Joseph Fletcher have emphasized the importance of love rather than rules. Feminist 
ethicists such as Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings have advocated an ethics of care which 
emphasizes our affective and relational nature and the importance of attending to the needs of the 
particular other. While these thinkers agree on many essentials, they characterize the other-
regarding affections in different ways. A detailed analysis of appeals to pity and sympathy would 
have to attend to these shades of meaning (Beam, 1996; Walton, 1997a), though here I will use 
these terms broadly and inclusively. 
Appeals to fear exploit another emotion. Discussions of this fallacy characterize it in 
terms of making a threat as well as evoking irrational emotion.  It Auses the threat of harm to 
advance one=s conclusion@ (Engel, 1994: p232). But the threat need not be direct. As in the 
opening dialogue, one could urge someone not to speed by pointing out that it may cause one to 
be fined by the police or hurt in an accident. Or a peace activist could dwell on the horrors of 
nuclear war in order to persuade people to work for disarmament. Most advocacy for prudence or 
safety involves some appeal to fear. Such arguments function like the appeal to pity, using the 
risk of suffering as a reason for action or refraining from action. 
Like sympathy, fear can function as an important ethical incentive. For Hobbes, fear is 
the most important of the passions that incline men to peace. Continual fear of violent death is 
the worst feature of a state of nature, and it is the desire to escape this which leads human beings 
to institute a social contract (Hobbes, 1962: chap.13). Fear is the basis of both equality and law. 
People must respect one another as essentially equal, since the weakest has enough strength to 
kill the strongest. And fear of punishment is regarded as the only reliable guarantor of promises 
and contracts. In short, Hobbes, develops a foundational ethics on the basis of an extended 
appeal to fear. Such arguments remain relevant and convincing as a tough-minded response to 
the question of Awhy be moral.@ 
 
 
Other Strategies  
 
Some informal logicians would acknowledge a role for pity in argument, but would limit 
the fallacy of ad miseracordiam to cases in which pity is evoked inappropriately or excessively. 
This is more sensible than branding all appeals to pity as fallacies. However, the question of 
when and to what degree pity is appropriate remains an ethical question, not a matter of logic. It 
is for Aristotelian phonesis to decide if we should bend the rules or make an exception out of 
sympathy. The some goes for appeals to fear. Ethical reasoning must determine what threats are 
permissible and what dangers we should allow to influence our moral deliberations. Moreover, 
any type of argument can be used inappropriately or excessively. Those who believe sympathy 
and caring to be ethically central would warn us against the Afallacy of rule-worship@ which can 
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occur whenever the needs of individuals are subordinated to inflexible rules or principles. A 
good neo-Aristotelian would agree that one can depart from the mean in two directions B too 
much adherence to rules, as well as too much susceptibility to emotion.  
Appeals to pity or fear are sometimes made when the issue is strictly one of truth or fact, 
not of values. I would acknowledge that such appeals are fallacious. If someone were to argue, 
ABelieve that 2 + 2 = 5 or I=ll torture you,@ as O=Brien does in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the threat of 
force would not be a cogent reason for revising any of the truths of arithmetic. It is doubtful that 
we can make ourselves believe what seems absurd merely to escape a threat, as critics of Pascal=s 
Wager have argued. Similarly, if a Jewish father were to implore his son: AGenerations of our 
people have suffered for the Jewish faith, so how can you not believe in God?@, the son could 
logically reply that sympathy or respect for what his ancestors endured is not a cogent argument 
for the existence of God. Thus, Nietzsche argued that the deaths of the martyrs proved nothing 
about the truth of Christianity (Nietzsche, 1954: pp.636-37). 
It is rare, however, for pity and fear to be brought into debates that are purely epistemic. 
Most of the textbook examples have an ethical dimension. Consider the following: 
 
(1) Sir, my dream is to go to medical school and become a doctor. I need at least an 80% 
average. But I=m working 15 hours a week to pay tuition and don=t have as much time to study as 
other students. If the B you gave me goes on my transcript it will seriously hurt my chances. Is 
there anything you can do? 
(2) The Israeli government should accept the right of Palestinians to a national homeland, 
because otherwise the Palestinians will continue their campaign of terrorism indefinitely. Israel 
will never have peace until it recognizes this right (Hughes, 2000: p.168) . 
 
The first example is a classic plea that is familiar to all instructors. Similar appeals are 
made in courts of law and other contexts in which authorities are expected to adjudicate a body 
of rules. According to Walton, the fallacy here consists in shifting the dialogue away from the 
kind of deliberation in which the professor and student are supposed to be engaged (1997a: 
p.191). In other words, the student=s personal situation and career goals are irrelevant to 
deliberations about the quality of his academic work. However, deciding which factors are 
irrelevant seems to be an essentially ethical decision. A Kantian would reject such an appeal. No 
exceptions to the rule of impersonal, objective grading! But a caring professor might reflect: 
AHere is a concrete person, a victim of economic disadvantage, who seems naturally bright. The 
medical school already assists various groups through affirmative action, so it=s not like they=re 
complete sticklers for merit. Grading is partly subjective, anyway. What I consider a B, that 
grade-inflater down the hall would mark more generously. Surely I could look over the students 
work and give him the benefit of the doubt, without compromising my integrity. Surely I=m more 
than a gatekeeper in a heatless system?@ The ethics of this view are controversial. But a professor 
must recognize that he is not just grading the student=s academic work in a vacuum. He is also 
helping to decide the destiny of a particular person. 
Many hold that appeals to pity are irrelevant when a jury decides the guilt or innocence of 
the accused, but may be taken into account later when the person is sentenced. The truth of the 
person=s guilt is one thing B grounds for mercy are another. But often such nice distinctions 
cannot be made in practice. For example, a person accused of mercy-killing his severely retarded 
daughter (like Robert Latimer in Saskatchewan) is brought before a jury on a charge of murder. 
The law mandates a minimum 10-year sentence upon conviction. The accused comes across as a 
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well-meaning person who acted out of a mixture of love and desperation. He did kill his 
daughter, but it seems heart-breaking to put him in prison for 10 years. Should the jury declare 
him guilty? Or spare him a long prison sentence in the only way it can, by not voting to convict? 
Those who believe in the right of juries to serve as a check and balance on the judicial system 
would approve of allowing sympathy to enter into the decision. 
In the second example, many would see the likelihood of continued terrorism as 
irrelevant to the Aright@ of the Palestinians to a homeland. Logically, this is analogous to 
someone arguing that you should recognize the Aright@ of a schoolyard bully to your lunch 
money, since he will beat you up daily unless you hand it over. The problem is that rights are 
moral concepts, and it is hard to see how they could be derived from coercion based on superior 
force. An ethnic group might have a right to territory because of prior occupancy, or because 
they were deprived of it unjustly. But if such a right were based on force, it could be overridden 
if others summon superior force. 
However, this does not mean that appeals to force are irrelevant to practical reasoning. In 
the tough-minded view of a Thrasymachus or a foreign policy realist, they are highly relevant. 
For example, America may say to its allies: ASupport our foreign policy or face economic 
reprisals.@ Such threats may serve as a compelling reason for weaker nations to support or obey 
the USA. But they provide no basis for loving the USA or regarding its policies as just. Fear and 
threats only give others reason to obey out of prudence, so long as they remain vulnerable to 
negative consequences. Those who rely on fear may find it hard, without self-contradiction, to 
defend ethical claims that go beyond Athe strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must.@ 
 
 
Authority and Popularity 
 
Appeals to authority and popularity are another pair of arguments that are closely related. 
For in appealing to popular opinion or the consensus of the ages, one treats these as authorities. 
The ad populum may be classed a special form of the appeal to authority which is based, not on 
prophets or experts, but on the views of the many. 
Appeals to authority have been accused of trading on emotion. The Latin name for the 
fallacy, argumentum ad verecundiam, suggests that it appeals to our modesty B our feeling of  
reverence for great names. The term was coined by Locke in an era in which science was 
challenging the authority of Aristotle and the church. The textbooks link appeals to popularity 
with irrational appeals to mob feeling. The pedigree of such accounts points back to Plato=s 
Republic and the view that the masses are ruled by appetite or desire. Yet appeals to authority or 
popularity need not be emotional. Even the most dispassionate of reasoners must rely on the 
word of scientific experts in some contexts, or take the wishes of the democratic majority into 
account in others. 
Appeals to authority or popularity also have no special relevance to practical reason. It is 
questionable whether there are any genuine authorities in ethics. When textbooks discuss how to 
evaluate appeals to authority, they tend to enumerate criteria such as the following: 
 
(1) The authority must be identified. 
(2) The authority must be generally recognized by the experts in the field. 
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(3) The particular matter in support of which an authority is cited must lie within his or her field 
of expertise. 
(4) The field must be one in which there is genuine knowledge. 
(5) There should be a consensus among experts in the field regarding the particular matter in 
support of which the authority is cited (Hughes, 2000: pp.173-174). 
 
Points two and five are especially problematic in ethics. There are no generally 
recognized ethical authorities and little consensus in the field. The claims of religious scriptures 
and spiritual leaders contradict one another and are rejected by secularists. Philosophical ethicists 
often treat appeals to religious authority as a fallacy. They also subject the authority of law to 
scrutiny, denying that legality can be equated with morality. However, philosophical ethicists 
disagree in turn about meta-ethics, ethical theory, and practical issues. While Kant and Mill have 
a secure place in the ethics cannon, nobody takes their views on authority. 
When appeals to authority were criticized in the early modern period, the point usually 
was that people should investigate the world using their own reason and their own senses. Ethical 
argument, however, needs to somehow appeal to the values and preferences of other people. We 
might ask:@Would the majority be happier in a socialist society? Does Rawls= view of justice 
reflect our intuitions about justice? Is it consistent with our tradition of liberalism? Given current 
values, is it a realistic proposal?@ In order words, we appeal to popularity in many ways, some of 
which are more direct than others. Appeals to tradition or Awhat our moral intuitions say@ are 
variants of the appeal to popularity. The authority of tradition is based on what was popular in 
the past. The persuasiveness of arguments from intuition depends on our moral intuitions being 
widely shared. Democracy is based on a fairly direct appeal to majority opinion. When we 
attempt to judge what is practical in a democratic context, we again pay homage to popularity. 
 
 
Utilitarianism 
 
An element of popularity can even be found in classical utilitarianism, with its focus on 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number. On this view, what is right is what maximizes 
pleasure. There are no standards beyond this, no basis for arguing that something is valuable 
beyond the fact that people desire it. True, a utilitarian need not be enslaved to popular opinion 
regarding the means of promoting utility. She may challenge majority views and encourage 
critical examination of moral prejudices in ways that a traditionalist would never dare. But she 
must do this for the sake of reforming institutions so that they better maximize the pleasure of 
the majority. In one sense, the utilitarian is subversive of popular morality. In another, she insists 
that nothing matters (Apushpin is as good as poetry@) except giving the people what they want. 
There is a similarly uneasy contrast in the relation between utilitarianism and sympathy. 
On one hand, utilitarianism wants to be a universal and objective theory of ethics. It frowns on 
any kind of partially for our family, friends, or community. We should do what will promote the 
greatest happiness of humanity. In Peter Singer=s version of the theory, we are asked to go further 
and take into account, not merely our own species, but all sentient beings. Of course, as soon as 
someone asks why we should care about the happiness of all these creatures, the utilitarian has 
little choice but to appeal to sympathy. She must arouse pity for child labourers on the other side 
of the world, and for chickens in factory farms. If such appeals fail, the utilitarian is not likely to 
get far in moral reform. 
 6 
C.Beam’s “The ‘Fallacies’ of Pity and Fear: Logic, Sentiment, and Ethical Argument” 
The is illustrated by a film about Peter Singer and animal rights that I have shown in class 
(In Defense of Animals, 1990). Near the beginning Singer insists that he is not an Aanimal lover@ 
who is sentimental about animal suffering. His revolutionary achievement is to defend animals 
on the basis of rational ethical theory. The concept of speciesism is explained. Later, the film 
looks at practical issues like animal experimentation and factory farming. We are shown graphic 
images of rabbits being blinded with chemicals in the Draize test, and chickens having their 
beaks cut off so they can=t peck each other in overcrowded cages. Such visual appeals to pity had 
a greater impact on my students than Singer=s abstract moral arguments. If you really want to 
expand people=s circle of concern, it appears, you must engage their sympathy.  
 
 
Kantian Principles 
 
Are there good ethical arguments that don=t rely on pity, fear, authority, popularity, or 
any sort of appeal to emotion? I think not. The most likely candidate would be a Kantian-style 
morality of principles or categorical imperatives. Such an approach would declare an action to be 
right or wrong on the basis of objective moral principles. Let=s look back at our opening 
examples. On the question of obeying the speed limit, such an argument might be: AYou ought to 
obey laws that are enacted by a democratic government, because such laws are morally 
legitimate.@ And in the case of cruelty to the cat, perhaps: AIt is wrong to cause unnecessary pain 
to any creature, because the maxim of such an action cannot be universalized.@ 
The first argument isn=t very satisfactory. Invoking moral legitimacy in this way is like 
arguing: AIt=s right to do x, because x is right.@ This is the sort of question-begging rut that people 
fall into when they can offer no further reasons for their premises. When people ask that moral 
claims be justified, they typically want to be shown that doing x is really harmful to the person 
who does it (i.e. that it is contrary to prudence) or harmful to others or society (i.e. contrary to 
sympathy). To argue that laws enacted democratically are by definition morally right involves a 
crude appeal to popularity. Another option would be to invoke utilitarianism. But appeals to the 
greatest happiness, as we have seen, also lead back to popularity or sympathy. 
The other argument is based on the categorical imperative. But this isn=t a very reliable 
moral guide. First, some things cannot be universalized yet are morally permissible, while other 
things can be universalized yet are morally questionable. Kant was a bachelor, and if everyone 
did likewise the human race would die out, yet nobody thinks that we have a universal duty to 
have children. Conversely, many people who speed on the highway would be content to 
universalize the maxim of their action, and would not mind if everyone drove 130 kilometres per 
hour. Second, the universalization argument relies, in some sense, on fear or pity for its 
persuasive power. It reminds the cruel person that if he inflicts needless cruelty, others may feel 
entitled to do the same to him. What goes around comes around. Those who receive a dose of 
their own medicine cannot very well complain without hypocrisy. The thought that one is 
vulnerable to the same treatment is also a powerful stimulus to sympathy. And sympathy 
prompts us to grant moral consideration to others, to think of them as ends rather than mere 
means. Thus, when the boy who grabbed the cat by the tail is asked how he would like being 
picked up by the ears, this question can be read several ways. It can be taken as a direct threat, or 
an attempt to raise the universalization argument, or an attempt to elicit sympathy for the cat. 
The idea that Aneedless cruelty is wrong@ may be regarded by some as a basic moral 
axiom, for which further justification is neither possible nor necessary. However, if we are 
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inclined to see such a principle as undeniable, it is because psychologically healthy people have 
an aversion to causing needless pain. Where sympathy is present, the knowledge that Apicking 
the cat up by the tail causes pain to the cat@ is sufficient reason not to do this. But if sympathy is 
absent, the additional claim that Acausing pain is wrong@ adds nothing, unless some sort of 
punishment is threatened for wrong behaviour (Noddings, 1990: pp.90-92). Of course, things get 
more complex in balance-of-consideration arguments, such as the debate over war with Iraq. 
Here the anti-war argument that Acausing misery and death to innocent civilians is wrong@ may 
be met by a counter appeal to sympathy, which bids us to consider the misery and death that 
have been caused by Saddam Hussein=s regime. Invoking pity against pity in this way is one of 
the most effective ways of countering this appeal in debate. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Where does this leave us? I have tried to show that reliance on appeals to sympathy, 
prudence, or popularity is inescapable in moral argument, and can be perfectly valid. There are 
subtle and crude versions of these appeals, but no purer, more rational and objective form of 
moral argument that transcends them 
The analysis of such appeals remains an enlightening exercise. Informal logic texts 
should retire the notion that arguments are tainted if they invoke emotion or popular opinion in 
their premises. Rather students should be shown a variety of appeals to sympathy and prudence, 
authority and popularity, and asked to critically assess why some are more cogent than others. 
Criteria of adequacy could be proposed. Students could be warned that these appeals need to be 
evaluated differently in ethical contexts than in purely epistemic ones. Strategies could be 
outlined for arguing back against such appeals. Courses in ethics could also profit from including 
detailed analysis of moral arguments of this type. 
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